“Be nervous, county taxpayers and pensioners—very
nervous,” warned local newspaper U-T San Diego’s
editorial board in August 2014. Just four months before the op-ed was
published, the now-$10.6 billion San Diego County Employees Retirement
Association (SDCERA) had begun a “scary new chapter.”
Its outsourced-CIO Salient
Partners introduced risk parity into the portfolio.
The
editorial called SDCERA’s 20% risk parity allocation “difficult to swallow.”
The strategy involved leveraging assets—“an aggressive investing tactic that is
loved by hedge funds and disdained by such investment experts as Warren Buffett
and by pension funds in general.” Furthermore, U-T San Diego
had doubts about Houston-based Salient, its leader Lee Partridge, and their
reported track record. It said SDCERA’s returns over the three and five years
ending September 30, 2013—having hired Salient as its main strategist in
2009—were “only 84th out of 100 comparable funds.” According to Wilshire, SDCERA ranked in the 64th percentile over the three years and 73rd over five years ending September 30, 2013.
The paper argued that adding what it thought was an even riskier strategy on top of these numbers could make matters worse. “It
could work out well if Partridge has a great run in picking investments—a much
better one than he’s had to date,” the editorial board wrote.
To these claims, Salient has
consistently responded that it has successfully placed SDCERA “as a
top-performing public pension plan in the country” and said it generated a net
annualized return of 9.42% over the last five-and-a-half years, exceeding the
plan’s 7.75% target return.
Yet matters somehow got even
worse at SDCERA. Dissatisfied with their risk parity portfolio’s relative
underperformance to rallying equities, trustees developed doubts about the
newfangled strategy. On May 21, 2015, SDCERA hired an internal CIO, sidelining
risk parity, Salient, and Partridge—and further entrenching the risk parity
market’s status quo.
The risk parity space isn’t like
large-cap equity, where investors have hundreds of strategies to choose from. As
of 2015, there are just 10 to 12 firms running risk parity products. And,
according to consultants, the biggest and oldest names in the business have
already scooped up most of the mandates. (Salient, born in 2003, managed $2.48 billion in its risk parity fund as of the end of 2014.)
“Investors tend to gravitate
towards the big players in risk parity largely because of their name and
legacy,” says Matt Maleri, partner at Rocaton Investment Advisors.
“Bridgewater, for example, is credited with founding the strategy and has had a
risk parity fund since the mid-’90s. With a long track record like that—and an
institutional pedigree—it was able to enjoy a first-mover advantage, gaining
both investors’ confidence and assets.”
Since
launching the All Weather strategy in 1996, Bridgewater has continued to build
out its legacy as the Godfather of risk parity, and reportedly had $82 billion
in the fund as of end of 2014. Clients also told CIO’s 2014 Risk Parity Survey that their existing relationship with the
hedge fund giant largely convinced them to allocate to All Weather. The
Westport, Connecticut-based firm also won their clients over with service: Some
three-quarters of Bridgewater’s respondents said the company’s client service
deserved a five out of five.
AQR’s risk parity strategy—with $30 billion as of December 2014—is also quickly becoming prominent since launching
10 years ago. It is slightly more dynamic than Bridgewater’s
traditional passive approach, using tilts to move in and out of assets. (Bridgewater
also recently launched a more dynamic risk parity product alongside All
Weather—its Optimal Portfolio fund—that has reportedly brought in billions of
dollars in a short amount of time.) AQR also benefits from its legacy as an
alternatives manager, with clients pointing to their existing relationship in
deciding to invest in its risk parity fund. In addition, nearly a third of the
survey’s respondents said their advisers had recommended AQR, illustrating how
the firm is becoming not only a favorite among asset owners, but also
consultants.
The list of big dominating firms
goes on. According to Morningstar, Invesco, Wellington, and Columbia are among
the top names dwarfing the next echelon of products in size.
This oligopoly bears bad news for
newer risk parity shops. The root of the problem, says Maleri, is that
investable assets in risk parity are finite—and so are ways for providers to
think outside the box.
“There has already been a lot of
creativity in the market—some strategies are pure parity, by-the-book, and
passive, while others are more tactical in nature, perhaps with an overweight
on growth,” he continues. “The list of asset classes included in these
strategies is also exhausted, making it difficult for firms to differentiate
themselves from one another.”
Even if newer firms are able to
create a fresh product that could stand out among the Bridgewaters, the
Wellingtons, and all others in between, they could run into hesitation and
doubt from investors. “It also may be more difficult for asset owners to get
comfortable with the new players, particularly since risk parity often involves
using derivatives and leverage,” Maleri says.
Many may be uncomfortable with
such complex investment vehicles, as seen by U-T
San Diego’s statements. But according to Bridgewater, once investors
become used to looking at leverage in a “less black-and-white way—‘no leverage
is good and any leverage is bad’”—they become more accepting of its use as an
implementation tool.
“A moderately levered, highly
diversified portfolio is less risky than an unleveraged, undiversified
portfolio,” the firm wrote in an article on All Weather’s origin story. “If you
can’t predict the future with much certainty and you don’t know which
particular economic conditions will unfold, then it seems reasonable to hold a
mix of assets that can perform well across all different types of economic
environments.”
The
question remains, for smaller and newer firms without Bridgewater’s gravitas,
how do you convince potential clients that you’re capable of handling these
tools? Rocaton’s Maleri says younger shops that are able to show a history, a
track record, or a legacy running products with derivatives and leverage could
have an edge—enough to break in and compete with the big dogs. There could also
be opportunities to win mandates once larger funds soft- or hard-close, he
adds, and assets trickle down to smaller firms.
“There
are so many flavors and philosophies when it comes to risk,” says Kristin
Reynolds, partner at NEPC. “Managers have to consider how clients are thinking
about structuring risk in their portfolios. There are strategies across the
gamut. A few years ago, the trend leaned towards dynamically allocating, but
more recently, there has been a push towards an equal risk profile with dynamic
and tactical allocations underneath that. The key is to find a niche that will
appeal to asset owners and their needs.”
Reynolds adds that there are a handful of
institutional portfolios moving towards risk parity on a total fund level, much
like the innovators at the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and State of
Wisconsin Investment Board. With the first leg of the first-mover advantage
already past, perhaps newer shops can compete alongside the powerful elite with
their own personal selling point: diversification.

Note: An earlier version of this article misstated SDCERA’s risk parity allocation (as of August 2014) and Salient’s risk parity assets under management. It has been updated with the correct figures.