Interrogation: Roger Gray Thinks Governance Equals Performance

From aiCIO Magazine's Summer Issue: Gray—via Oxford, Harvard, Rothschild, UBS, and Hermès—arrived at the United Kingdom's US$52 billion Universities Superannuation System in 2009, intent on furthering internal management and governance strength.

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“Governance structures are key to appropriately setting and achieving your objectives. There is some empirical evidence that governance spend and investment performance are positively correlated. That said, you need to be realistic about what you can do successfully with your resources, organization, and decisionmaking capabilities. We do internally what we think we can do with competence. There were 65 internal staff when I joined USS in September 2009; now, there are 90. We’ve built up teams in a few different areas— notably across our control functions—the investment risk team, the legal department, and compliance. Besides these, however, our alternatives team has also grown and is now 15 strong. We are extending the range of our activities here, including both fund investments and co-investments. We’re not at the level of some of the Canadian funds yet, where alternatives broadly defined may comprise near to 50% of the assets. Their strategy sits well within heavily internal and direct management. Unlike some of these funds, we haven’t led a consortium or made solo direct investments yet. At some point, we might cross that bridge. Meanwhile, co-investment hopefully will help us to achieve better returns and reduce cost drag. To secure the talent, we need to be successful, we must offer a credible proposition in a competitive market. We don’t and can’t compete with the likes of Goldman, but the ethos here and the associated overall package hopefully will draw and retain the right people for our goals. We are long-term, not quarterly, performance; about investing, not distribution; about delegating responsibility and supporting the success of our team. However, clearly, there are skill domains we can’t reach cost-effectively. When these are needed to accomplish our target asset allocation, we go external. As for our allocation, we are moving gradually to a less risky allocation relative to our liabilities, but not toward a matching or immunized portfolio. We have more listed equities than the typical endowment model and are broadly converging toward 50% equities, 20% fixed income, 20% alternatives, and 10% property (mainly British commercial properties). When I arrived, the alternatives bucket was closer to 10% – it is now around 16% and has been funded out of developed market equities. Of this, roughly 8% is in private capital, 3% in infrastructure, 4% in hedge funds, and 1% in timber and commodities. We’re not attracted to commodities as a strategic allocation, to forever-rolling one-month futures contracts. We are open to other approaches—and commodities are attractive as a tactical allocation or potentially as an active management domain within a hedge fund. We’re looking to develop our allocation to other alternatives, including infrastructure. We remain an open defined benefit scheme, so we have long-dated, inflation-linked liabilities. The draw for us toward infrastructure is to secure long-dated income streams with inflation linkage, congruent with our liabilities. In the end, it is a matter of knowing what you are looking for and working out how you can best access it. Your governance structures should help you to get there.”



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Book Review: Money and Power and Indiscreet Emails

From aiCIO Magazine's Summer Issue: William Cohan's Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World is the latest addition to a renaissance in financial writing.

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In 1920s Paris, a cadre of writers—Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ezra Pound, James Joyce, Gertrude Stein, and others— flowed in and out of Left Bank bars like their livers would never shrivel, their youth would never fade, and their talent would never die. The Great War was their influence and foil; it hardly would be controversial to claim that A Farewell to Arms would never have reached classic status had Hemingway not driven an ambulance in Italy, that The Great Gatsby would be missing its haunting melancholy without Fitzgerald’s exposure to the sorrow of post-war Europe.

Now, William Cohan’s Money and Power is not The Sun Also Rises or Ulysses. I know this, William Cohan knows this, but it is not outside the realm of reality to claim that we are living through a similar renaissance in financial literature. Our Great War is the global financial crisis; our masterpieces are the works of Cohan and his brethren.

I’m not sure Cohan was always in this group—which could be said to count Michael Lewis and Roger Lowenstein as its founding members—but, with this attempt, he is now. The best of financial journalism today must combine two things: details that entice, and a narrative arc that unites. In his earlier work—The Last Tycoons, his pre-crisis book on the history of Lazard Freres, specifically— Cohan leaned toward the encyclopedic. Details of any size were included. If you wanted to know what Felix Rohatyn ate for breakfast in 1975, you would check with Cohan. With Money and Power, however, the author tends toward 21st century literary prudence: still providing detail, but more willing to replace the mundane with the juicy. There is plenty of juice to go around: to read about the putsch orchestrated by Hank Paulson against Jon Corzine is worth the price of the book alone, saying nothing of the schadenfreude experienced during the section on Fabrice Tourre, the young man who, along with his indiscreet e-mails, was thrown to the wolves/ Congress by Goldman. (It turns out that the Fabulous Fab enjoyed messaging both his co-worker girlfriend and his Columbia grad-school mistress from his work e-mail account). While Tycoons was a good read, it bordered on forsaking readability for details; Money and Power balances the two, to the benefit of the reader. Proof of this can be seen in the very structure of the book. Like many an investment bank, Goldman had humble beginnings, and Cohan spends a respectable amount of time detailing the path of German immigrant “Marcus Goldman, Banker and Broker…buying and selling IOUs from local businessmen” in New York City following younger days in the “peddlers paradise” of Philadelphia but, unlike with Tycoons, perhaps, he realizes that the reader isn’t sitting on his couch in desperate anticipation of what Goldman did next with his reams of corporate paper. An overwhelming number of those who bought the book will have done so to gain insight into its more recent past, and Cohan gets this: The firm was founded in 1869 but, less than halfway through these 600 pages, we’re already in the Reagan-era boom.

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This is a book for a different time in the financial world than when Tycoons was produced—and perhaps a different time in P Cohan’s world as well. It is not enough to be well-written—a book, to make an impact, must be well-read. Cohan seems to have come to this understanding, and the reader is the better for it. The majority of his time seems to have been spent pounding the driveways of current and former Goldman partners, and this research—much more so than the archival digging he will have had to do for the beginning of the book—brings it alive.

In the age of instant communication, it has become increasingly difficult to provide readers with something they haven’t read before. Hemingway could be relatively certain that there were inefficiencies in the coverage of the Italian front, thus allowing him space to fill with originality. Cohan, dealing with Goldman Sachs, has no such luxury. Lloyd Blankfein has stonewalled reporters before, and he’ll do it again. We now know plenty about how hedge fund billionaire John Paulson advised Goldman on an ABACUS synthetic CDO with the intent of choosing the worst mortgages possible so that his fund could short them. Like any efficient financial market, the good stories have been told. This leaves authors such as Cohan at a disadvantage compared with both a Wall Street Journal reporter and literary masters from a century ago.

What must be realized is that this doesn’t make books like this any less important or entertaining. Like Lewis, Lowenstein, and other works (Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail comes to mind), Money and Power provides convenient access to the history, ancient and recent, of what now must be considered one of the most American of all institutions. Wall Street will now wait to see which subject he chooses next—and so will we. —Kip McDaniel 



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