Gross Questions PIMCO’s Stability

The ex-bond king says it doesn’t make sense for PIMCO to use derivatives to manage liquidity and outflows from funds.

Bill GrossBill Gross has warned that his former employer’s liquidity management strategies are “counterintuitive” and prove high risk in the event of a major market shock.

In his latest outlook letter to Janus’ investors, the former bond king named PIMCO—the company he left suddenly last year—among the providers of mutual funds, hedge funds, and exchange-traded funds that make up the “shadow banking system”.

“Long used to the inevitability of capital gains, investors and markets have not been tested during a stretch of time when prices go down and policymakers’ hands are tied to perform their historical function of buyer of last resort,” Gross wrote. “It’s then that liquidity will be tested.”

According to Gross, the Dodd-Frank law transferred systemic risk from investment banks to this “shadow-banking system” following the financial crisis, as banks were required to de-risk their balance sheets.

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Certain market conditions—such as a fall in bond prices, Greece’s potential default, emerging market crisis, and geopolitical risks—could precipitate a “run on the shadow banks,” Gross continued.

“Since they in effect now are the market, a rush for liquidity on the part of the investing public, whether they be individuals in 401(k)s or institutional pension funds and insurance companies, would find the ‘market’ selling to itself with the Federal Reserve severely limited in its ability to provide assistance,” he added.

Earlier this month, PIMCO’s CEO Douglas Hodge wrote to the Financial Stability Board that outflows from funds do not pose a systemic risk to the financial system.

In addition, the Newport Beach, California-based bond shop said it has successfully managed more than $50 billion in redemptions from the Total Return Fund after Gross’ exit last year, without any “fire sales” or “forced selling.”

Instead, PIMCO said it was able to support cash buffers and inflows using derivatives for exposures.

Calling such practice “counterintuitive,” Gross emphasized that derivatives often represent increased leverage and risk, “presenting possible exit and liquidity problems in future months and years.”

ETFs and mutual funds also do not have built-in “gates” preventing an overnight exit if liquidity dries out, he continued.

“That an ETF can satisfy redemption with underlying bonds or shares only raises the nightmare possibility of a disillusioned and uninformed public throwing in the towel once again after they receive thousands of individual odd lot pieces under such circumstances,” Gross warned.

Despite criticizing PIMCO’s redemption management, Gross told Bloomberg he checks his old firm’s bond funds daily to see how he’s measuring up at Janus.

“I have a happy night if I’m doing better and a not-so-happy night if I’m not doing better,” he said.

Related: PIMCO: Outflows Do Not Pose Systemic Risk & Gross Calls Bund Short ‘Well Timed, Not Well Executed’

Are Investors’ Expectations Being Met?

Investors are putting their faith in outsourcing—but how many really know what they are getting?

CIOE615-Column-Ralph-Frank-PortraitRalph FrankThe field of solvency management/fiduciary management/delegated consulting/outsourced-CIO/implemented advice (referred to collectively as empowered practitioners (EP)) is fast growing. Parties interested in EP face a range of challenges, not least of all figuring out what is being offered. A distinction needs to be drawn between where advice is given (but the client is responsible for taking the end decision) and where the EP takes and executes decisions for which it is then accountable. Measuring the quality of advice is a long-standing challenge—and not one to be tackled in this piece. However, I propose that it is possible to measure and compare the quality of management.

An EP mandate is tailored to the client’s specific circumstances—it’s a service, not a product. Consequently, each client/EP agreement will likely have a different benchmark, performance target, risk metric, and attaching tolerance. These parameters frame the client’s assessment of whether the EP has met the expectations created on appointment, in isolation. Comparison of EPs’ delivery on expectations across clients, with a range of parameters, has been sought too. It is possible to create such a meaningful comparison.

The first step is to consider whether the EP has delivered on the excess return targeted relative to the benchmark. Comparability follows from calculating what percentage of the excess return targeted has been achieved. For example, if an excess return of 2% per annum is being targeted and the mandate has delivered 19% compared to a benchmark return of 18%, then 50% of the target has been delivered.

The second step is to assess how much of the risk budget has been utilised in delivering the performance. Preferred definitions of risk (e.g. volatility, drawdowns, etc.) might differ by EP and client—there is no single “correct” measure. Some appointments might have multiple risk metrics, but a single metric needs to be “nominated” for use in the assessment process. The maximum permitted level of the metric is referred to as the “risk budget”. Comparability is achieved by assessing what percentage of the risk budget has been used in delivering the returns. The percentage approach renders the choice of risk measure irrelevant. If, for example, the strategy is being run with a risk budget—defined as volatility—of 5% per annum, but only 2% of risk is realised, then 40% has been utilised.

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The third step is to control for whether the EP has remained within the risk budget. An EP might achieve a multiple of the return target by taking a multiple of the risk—not what the client ordered, despite the risk taken having paid off. This control term is defined as:

  {1 – % of risk budget utilised compared to maximum anticipated} 

If the risk budget is exceeded then this term detracts from the overall score. For example, if the mandate has a risk budget of 5% per annum, but 7.5% of risk is realised, then 150% of the risk budget has been utilised and this term has a value of -0.5.

I refer to the resulting metric as the “Modified Risk-Adjusted Outcome”, computed as follows:

  {{% excess return achieved compared to targeted} ÷ {% risk budget utilised compared to maximum anticipated}} + {1 – % risk budget utilised compared
to maximum anticipated}
 

The metric gives an indication as to whether the risk and return expectations agreed between the EP and client have been met. Differences in benchmarks, return targets, definitions of risk, and/or risk budgets need not prevent meaningful assessment and comparison of EPs.

That was the easy part. Now for the terminology in this field to be simplified and made consistent…

Ralph Frank is the CEO of Charlton Frank.

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