Climate Disclosure Rises Sharply for Canadian Financial Firms

Report shows firms north of the border are increasingly adopting TCFD-aligned climate-risk disclosures.


Canadian financial firms are increasingly disclosing their climate risks in alignment with the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). According to a new report from the Global Risk Institute (GRI), there has been a 40% increase in the number of Canadian financial firms publicly disclosing their climate-related risk per the TCFD’s guidelines since 2017.

The study examined trends in climate-related financial disclosure among 58 financial firms in Canada, which includes banks, pensions, insurance firms, financial Crowns, and credit unions over the 2017, 2018, and 2019 reporting cycles. The Financial Stability Board introduced its recommendations for reporting in 2017, providing a framework for companies to disclose their material climate-related governance, strategy, management, and metrics and targets.

“Climate change-related risk is both a competitive issue and a regulatory issue—the landscape is changing dramatically and the Canadian financial sector must be ready,” Sonia Baxendale, president and CEO of GRI, said in statement. “As the world shifts to a low-carbon economy, there will be increasing expectations, and we need to ensure that Canada’s natural resource-based economy is an asset and not a liability.”

According the study, 44% of firms disclosing climate risk included TCFD-recommended information in annual reports, up from only 12% in 2017. It also found that nearly 80% of disclosing firms reported that they were assessing risk over the short, medium and long terms, and, among those, 70% disclosed the specific risks they were facing in each of the time horizons.

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The number of firms reporting that they have undertaken climate risk scenario analysis has more than tripled during the 2017 to 2019 time period, and 72% of firms disclosed that they undertook a materiality assessment for climate risk, up from 44% in 2017.

The report also outlines steps that can be taken by policymakers, companies, and investors to increase the quality and quantity of reporting, and to accelerate the road to adoption.

It said policymakers need to plainly articulate a road map for the adoption of the TCFD recommendations and outline what is expected and by when. They should also clarify what is mandatory and what is voluntary for both large companies and smaller ones.

The report also said company boards should increase their involvement in how climate risk is incorporated into corporate planning and discuss how climate risk and opportunities could impact future business plans. It also said firms should set and report on metrics and targets that are science-based and aligned with net-zero carbon emissions.

And for investors, the report said they should engage with senior executives and boards to encourage climate disclosure that is in alignment with TCFD recommendations and explain why and how the data is used. Additionally, the report suggests investors work with issuers to help increase understanding of climate risk and encourage commitment to emissions reductions and other actions toward carbon net-zero policies.

“I hope this report inspires those firms that have not yet taken steps to assess and report the financial implications of climate risk to get started, and those firms who are already solidly on the path to continuously push forward,” Baxendale wrote in the report. “In the end, facing climate change head on and taking action now is the right thing for future generations.”

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Why Brown Is Beating the Other Ivies

Markov Processes analyzes how Brown has managed to outperform its rivals in recent years.


The team behind Brown University’s endowment portfolio has become the envy of the Ivy League. The school led the league in returns for the second straight year this year, and it has returned more than 12% for four straight years and more than 10% annualized over the past decade. It is also the only Ivy League endowment to outperform a domestic 60-40 equity-bond index portfolio over the past two years.

And whenever someone outperforms the market and their competition, the first thing everyone else wants to know is how they did it. Some have attributed Brown’s strong performance to allocating a large share of its portfolio to private investments, while CIO Jane Dietze has credited Brown’s partnerships with “exceptional investment managers” for the portfolio’s performance, as well as its emphasis on risk management.

In an attempt to find out what sets Brown apart, investment research firm Markov Processes International analyzed the endowment’s investment approach, and looked for clues that might be hidden in its annual reports and audited financial statements.

In its analysis, the firm debunked the idea that the portfolio’s success was mainly driven by its allocation to private investments. Markov noted that Brown’s combined allocation to private equity and venture capital was 31.2% in fiscal year 2020, well below Yale’s 41% target allocation to private investments—and Yale’s returns were less than half of Brown’s for the past two years.

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“Essentially, asset allocations in both endowments were quite similar, with a strong emphasis on equity,” Markov said in its analysis, “yet they produced quite different results.”

And Markov said that while Dietze’s explanation is flattering for the endowment’s investment team and fund managers, “it doesn’t equate to much for performance and risk professionals who are used to hard numbers of performance attribution, factor beta, marginal and component risk, etc.”

After looking into Brown’s asset allocations over the past 10 years, Markov found that “absolute return strategies dominate” the portfolio. It also said that a significant portion of the absolute return segment is allocated to equity long-short hedge funds.

Markov noted that the technology sector has had “a phenomenal run” during the past two years, citing the S&P 500 Information Technology Index, which was up 35.9% in fiscal year 2020, well above Cambridge Associates’ private equity and venture capital, which were up 9% and 11.8%, respectively. Markov’s analysis also estimated that Brown’s exposure to technology almost doubled over the past three years.

“It is quite plausible to assume that technology is the missing factor that could explain the performance of Brown’s stable of long-short hedge fund managers when all ‘longs’ cancel out with all ‘shorts,’” Markov said.

In its analysis, Markov created a portfolio of generic asset class benchmarks, as well as a technology sector index, which were intended to predictively mimic the annual return of the Brown endowment portfolio. Comparing its quantitative analysis of annual returns and published allocation numbers taken from financial statements, Markov noted the similarity of the trends captured by rapidly increasing venture capital allocation and dwindling exposure to real assets.

At the same time, the research firm said its analysis overestimated private equity allocation while underestimating public equities with the combined allocation being about the same.

Three key takeaways from Markov’s analysis include:

  1. Brown’s investment team’s desire for the best talent could have created a significant over-exposure to the technology sector, which has so far worked to its advantage.
  2. Diversification is key—especially with a portfolio of hedge funds, which diversify at a faster rate than a portfolio of stocks due to the cancellation of opposite bets/themes between funds resulting in index-like behavior and returns.
  3. Significant alpha can often signal the deficiency of the model or a missing factor instead of a “skill.”

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