Editor-in-Chief's Letter: The Journalist and the Murderer

From aiCIO's November Issue: Liability-driven investing, provocative cover stories, and journalistic ethics.

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Having seen this cover, Kathy Lutito will be slightly worried. In 1990, New Yorker scribe Janet Malcolm penned The Journalist and the Murderer—an essay detailing the Faustian bargain between writer and subject. “Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on knows that what he does is morally indefensible,” she famously wrote. “He is a kind of confidence man…gaining [a subject’s] trust and betraying them without remorse. Like the credulous widow who wakes up one day to find the charming young man and all her savings gone, so the consenting subject of a piece of nonfiction learns—when the article or book appears—his hard lesson.”

Malcolm went on to describe the case of Jeffrey MacDonald, a doctor convicted of murdering his pregnant wife and their two daughters, who sued author Joe McGinniss over his non-fiction novel Fatal Vision. McGinniss had been given complete access to MacDonald’s legal defense, befriending the doctor and repeatedly stressing belief in MacDonald’s innocence—all while writing a book labeling him undoubtedly guilty. A shocked MacDonald sued for fraud from a jail cell, citing 40-odd fawning letters from the author. After a hung jury the two parties settled for hundreds of thousands of dollars, a convicted murderer receiving money from an author who by most accounts produced a book void of errors.

And as it is with murders, so it is with pensions—kind of. Whereas McGinniss approached Malcolm to share his side of the story, I approached Lutito—CIO of the CenturyLink Investment Management Company—to share hers. Pension executives, unlike convicted killers claiming innocence or journalists with a guilty conscience, have no great urge to tell their tale, and thus it took some convincing to allow me access to her world.

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But access she gave. On a July afternoon in Denver, Colorado, Lutito and her team hosted me in their offices to discuss liability-driven investing (LDI), and how their fund had avoided the worst of the financial crisis’ drawdowns. It was a story of foresight, success, and a little luck. It was meant to be a straight profile—fund X did this, then this, this happened, and this is what they learned—without much surprise or excitement.

But then the story changed. As we delved deeper into the world of LDI for our second dedicated issue on the subject, we noticed something: There was a demarcation line between those funds that successfully implemented some form of LDI before the fall of 2008—like Lutito’s CenturyLink—and those that didn’t. There was the rare fund making changes following the crisis, but they are few and far between. Thus, instead of writing a pure profile of Lutito and her fund, we decided to be more aggressive and ask the larger question: Is LDI dead?

For those of you who know your magazine history, that title should resonate. In 1966, Time magazine asked the question “Is God Dead?” on its cover. That issue set records for newsstand sales, and is now one of the most famous magazine covers of all time. The article itself was perhaps overly intellectual and failed to come up with a strong conclusion. But it asked a powerful question on an issue that the media had, until then, largely and willfully ignored.

For this issue of aiCIO, I think the template fits (besides the abstruse writing and weak finale, of course). I’ve often spoken about the inherent tension within an advertising-based magazine revenue model. Every editor who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on knows that there is a constant pull toward placating those who spend money ­advertising in the publication. It would be all too easy to write unfailingly positive portraits of LDI success in an issue where sponsors were all advertising a path to that very success. Thus, in an attempt to avoid being a shill—while still attempting to be fair to all sides—we asked the larger question.

But of course I worry about what Lutito will think. She is the quintessential corporate pension CIO: soft-spoken, thoughtful, intelligent, and adept at avoiding the spotlight. Will she consider what I did with this cover story—couching a profile of her fund within the larger and aggressive question posed in the title—a McGinniss-like betrayal? Will I be seen to be using her kind acceptance of my inquiry as a weapon against her? Will I, in short, be the remorseless journalist Janet Malcolm described? In her essay, Malcolm suggested that in the end, because he left such an obvious trail of deceit via the letters he sent the murderer MacDonald, McGinniss in fact secretly wanted to be exposed as the “morally indefensible” journalist we all are. I, for one, want no such surprise exposure. Thus, this letter: my mea culpa. In the end, I decided that Lutito and her team—like almost every pension management team I’ve met in the three years of running this publication—would value serious inquiry over furtive shilling. Just please don’t sue me, Kathy.

—Kip McDaniel, Editor-in-Chief, aiCIO

Pensions Allege JPMorgan Transformed CIO Unit Into Risky Prop-Trading Desk

A group of pension funds have filed a lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase & Co--the biggest bank by assets in the United States--noting that it has turned its risk-management unit into a "secret hedge fund" resulting in monumental losses.

(November 25, 2012) — A group of pension funds have claimed that JPMorgan turned its chief investment office into a secret hedge fund that caused more than $6.2 billion in losses.

JPMorgan Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon “secretly transformed the CIO from a risk management unit into a proprietary trading desk whose principal purpose was to engage in speculative, high-risk bets designed to generate profits,” the plaintiffs alleged, as reported by Bloomberg. The lead plaintiffs, which include the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, and the state of Oregon, allege that the bank’s risk-management practices misled investors, causing the more than $6.2 billion in losses.

The complaint was filed on behalf of JPMorgan shareholders who bought stock between February 24, 2010, when the company filed its 2009 earnings report with regulators, and May 21, 2012, when the bank revealed it was putting an ends to a $15 billion share buyback program until it could control the losses, Bloomberg reported.

“JPMorgan senior management made a conscious, strategic decision to use the CIO for proprietary trading in pursuit of short-term profits,” the plaintiffs said.

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The pension funds claim they suffered losses in their holdings as a result of trades by the chief investment office along with Bruno Iksil, known as “the London Whale.” In July, Ohio’s attorney general announced that three of the state’s largest pension funds would seek lead plaintiff status in the shareholder lawsuit against JPMorgan. Attorney General Mike DeWine, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, the School Employees Retirement System of Ohio, and the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio said at the time that it would sue JPMorgan over losses of $27.5 million that resulted from the bank’s plunging stock value. The state accused JPMorgan of deceiving investors about its trading activity by “describing risky and speculative trading strategies merely as ‘hedges’ and ‘risk management’ devices.”

“The filings allege that pension fund managers acting on behalf of Ohio retirees were given false and misleading information by JPMorgan Chase that hid the true nature of the bank’s risky trades, causing Ohio teachers, school employees, and public employees to lose tens of millions of hard-earned retirement dollars,” said DeWine at the time.

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