Wells Fargo to Pay $3 Billion Settlement for ‘Gaming’ Investors

Payment includes $500 million civil penalty distributed to investors by SEC.

Wells Fargo has agreed to pay $3 billion to resolve potential criminal and civil liabilities for pressuring employees to meet unrealistic sales targets during a 14-year span, which led them to open fake accounts for unwitting customers and sell unnecessary products that went unused.

The payment includes a $500 million civil penalty to be distributed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to investors for misleading them about the success of Wells Fargo’s core business strategy during the time it was opening the fake accounts.

Wells Fargo admitted to collecting millions of dollars in fees and interest to which it wasn’t entitled, harming the credit ratings of certain customers, and unlawfully misusing their personal information, according to the US Justice Department.

“This settlement holds Wells Fargo accountable for tolerating fraudulent conduct that is remarkable both for its duration and scope, and for its blatant disregard of customer’s private information,” Michael Granston, deputy assistant attorney general for the Justice Department’s Civil Division, said in statement.

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The Justice Department said the massive $3 billion payment was appropriate because of the “staggering size, scope, and duration of Wells Fargo’s illicit conduct.”

The criminal investigation into the company is being resolved with a deferred three-year prosecution agreement in which Wells Fargo will not be prosecuted if it follows certain conditions, which includes cooperating with additional government investigations.

Wells Fargo also entered a civil settlement agreement under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) based on the bank’s creation of false bank records. FIRREA authorizes the federal government to seek civil penalties against financial institutions that violate various predicate criminal offenses, including falsifying bank records.

According to the SEC’s cease-and-desist order, Wells Fargo increased its focus on sales volume and reliance on annual sales growth beginning in 1998. A core part of this sales model was the “cross-sell strategy” to sell existing customers additional financial products.

Wells Fargo repeatedly said its sales strategy was “needs based” and published a “cross-sell metric” in its annual reports and quarterly and annual SEC filings that purported to be the ratio of the number of accounts and products per retail bank household. During investor presentations and analyst conferences, Wells Fargo characterized its cross-selling strategy to investors as a key component of its financial success and often discussed its efforts to achieve cross-sell growth. Wells Fargo referred to the cross-sell metric as proof of its success at executing its core business strategy.

“In contrast to Wells Fargo’s public statements and disclosures about needs-based selling,” the order said, “the community bank implemented a volume-based sales model in which employees were directed, pressured, or caused to sell large volumes of products to existing customers, often with little regard to actual customer need or expected use.”

Internally, Wells Fargo referred to the illegal practices—which included using existing customers’ identities without their consent to open checking, savings, debit card, credit card, bill pay, and global remittance accounts— as “gaming.” The SEC said top Wells Fargo managers were aware of the gaming practices as early as 2002.

According to the SEC’s order, one Wells Fargo internal investigator called the problem a “growing plague,” while another said the problem was “spiraling out of control.” Even after senior managers questioned the implementation of the cross-sell strategy, the Justice Department said senior leadership refused to alter the sales model.

“Wells Fargo repeatedly misled investors, including through a misleading performance metric, about what it claimed to be the cornerstone of its community bank business model and its ability to grow revenue and earnings,” Stephanie Avakian, co-director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, said in a statement. “This settlement holds Wells Fargo responsible for its fraud and furthers the SEC’s goal of returning funds to harmed investors.”

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Multiemployer Pension Funding Reaches Pre-Financial Crisis Levels

Double-digit asset gains boost aggregate funded ratio to 85% in 2019.

Thanks to double-digit asset returns, the aggregate funded percentage of US multiemployer pension plans increased to 85% in 2019, up from 74% in 2018, and returning to pre-financial crisis levels of 2007, according to actuarial and consulting firm Milliman.

Milliman also reported that there is now a larger percentage of plans over 100% funded compared with 2007; however, struggling multiemployer pensions have not participated in the rebound due to plummeting discount rates as 104 plans are now below 50% funded, compared with just 28 in 2007.

Over the past decade, the weighted average discount rate has dropped approximately 50 basis points, and the aggregate funded percentage of the 130 plans in critical and declining status has been cut in half to 37% at the end of 2019 from 74% at the end of 2007.

“While about 130 plans continue on a path toward insolvency, the majority of non-critical plans have improved since 2007 and are at higher funding levels today,” Nina Lantz, a principal and consulting actuary at Milliman, said in a statement. “In addition to investment performance, many plans are seeing funding levels increase due to benefit and/or contribution adjustments made during the past decade.”

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Milliman reported that the overall funding shortfall for all plans declined by approximately $69 billion to a total of $107 billion during 2019. The improvement of the aggregate funded percentage to 85% from 74% was attributed primarily to asset returns in 2019 exceeding expectations.

According to Milliman’s December 2019 Multiemployer Pension Funding Study, many plans are also improving because of benefit and contributions adjustments made over the years, and are currently using excess contribution income over operating costs to pay down their shortfalls.

However, despite these changes, it said that many plans continue to operate with negative cash flow as benefit payments plus expenses exceed contributions and therefore remain vulnerable to investment volatility. Milliman said plans that have already reduced benefits and/or increased contributions may not be able to weather another market downturn because there is less room for additional adjustments.

Actuarial consulting firm Cheiron reported in December that as many as 117 multiemployer pension plans covering 1.4 million participants are underfunded by $56.5 billion, and could become insolvent within the next 20 years. And to make matters worse, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the government lifeboat for struggling pensions, has reported that its multiemployer program is likely to become insolvent within five years.

“The 2008 market shock exposed the growing maturity of many multiemployer plans,” the Milliman study said. “Over the past 12 years, the plans that have been able to make the adjustments necessary to improve funding have separated themselves from the plans that could not, resulting in a wider disparity of plans.”

As a result, the rich have gotten richer while the poor have become poorer as the gap between the non-critical plans and critical and declining plans continues to widen. Although the aggregate funded percentage of the multiemployer plans is now the same as it was in 2007, the percentage of plans above 100% funded has increased to 39% from 26% while the percentage of plans below 50% funded has quadrupled to 8% from 2%.

“Non-critical plans have largely recovered from the global financial crisis,” the study said. “Critical plans are not quite back to the funding level they were at prior to the 2008 crash, and prospects for recovery remain tenuous.” Milliman said that part of the problem for lower funded plans is that excess investment returns have had a smaller impact as asset values fall.

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